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 The ‘Europe with the Regions’ Before the Court of Justice   
 
By Carlo Panara 
 
This article analyses the case-law of the CJEU concerning the regions. 
It argues that there is a discrepancy between the progressive framing 
of an ‘Europe with the regions’ in the political sphere and the limited 
impact of the Court in this field. This discrepancy does not emerge 
everywhere, nor does it emerge with the same intensity in all sectors. 
Indeed, in a number of areas the CJEU has acknowledged the role 
and responsibilities of the regions. Examples include the right/duty of 
the regions to implement EU obligations, the protection of regional lan-
guages, as well as the ‘sufficient autonomy’ test developed by the 
CJEU in relation State aid. There is no ‘ideological opposition’ of the 
CJEU to an increasing ‘regionalisation’ of the EU. There are, however, 
structural hindrances which prevent the Court from promoting further 
advancements of the status of the regions in the European edifice, 
particularly as regards their participation in EU processes. Since the 
EU remains an ‘union of states’, the ‘Europe with the regions’ has de-
veloped so far, and is likely to continue to develop, via advancements 
reflected in policy-making practices, soft law arrangements and Treaty 
amendments, rather than via the ‘judge-made federalism' of the Court. 
 
KEYWORDS: ‘Europe with the regions’; national identity; principle of 
subsidiarity; nature of the EU; role of the Court of Justice of the EU.  
 
1. Introduction – 
The ‘long march’ of the regions within the EU   
 
Since the Treaty of Maastricht, the role of the regions and local authorities (the ‘Third 
Level’ of the EU,1 which hereafter I will refer to collectively as ‘regions’) has increased 
significantly. The regions input into law-making and policy-making processes both on 
the national level, in certain Member States (domestic participation to determine the 
negotiating position of the Member State), and on the EU level (direct participation in 
EU decision-making).2 One of the markers of regional participation in the EU is the 
opening-up of the Council of the EU to the potential participation of ‘ministers’ of re-
gional authorities entitled to ‘commit’ the national government and, since the Treaty of 
Lisbon, also to ‘cast its vote’.3  
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 Article 16(2) TEU: “The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at 
ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast 
its vote.” See F. Eggermont, ‘In the Name of Democracy: The External Representation of the 
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The institution by the Treaty of Maastricht of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and 
the introduction by the same Treaty of the principle of subsidiarity (upon pressure from 
the Belgian Regions and the German Länder) pursue the same fundamental objective; 
affording regional authorities a stronger role in the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon has further 
enhanced the position of the regions through their explicit incorporation into the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, which is now defined in the following terms:  
 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its ex-
clusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Mem-
ber States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.4 
 
Over the years the Commission has devoted considerable attention to the sub-national 
levels of governance. In the White Paper on European Governance, the regions and 
their associations, along with civil society organisations, are identified as an essential 
interface, as well as a source of legitimacy, for the EU.5 The Agenda 2020 of the Com-
mission further emphasises the role of local and regional authorities in delivering EU 
policy objectives.6 Since the 1980s many regions have established liaison offices in 
Brussels, primarily with the aim of lobbying the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment, as well as attracting investment and EU funding to the region.7 
The Lisbon Treaty acknowledges further the key role of the regions in the constitutional 
architecture of the EU. In addition to the reference to the ‘regional and local level’ in 
Article 5(3) TEU (subsidiarity), Article 10(3) TEU requires that, when possible, deci-
sions shall be taken by the level of government which is ‘closest’ to the citizen, whilst 
the new Subsidiarity Protocol promotes the involvement of regional parliaments with 
legislative powers in the ‘early warning system’ (cf. Article 6(1) Subsidiarity Protocol). 
However, the most symbolically significant recognition of the sub-national authorities 
comes from Article 4(2) TEU, pursuant to which the Union shall respect the national 
identities of the Member States “inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government” (emphasis added). 
The increasing presence of the regions on the EU level is certainly linked to the con-
stitutional evolution that has taken place in some Member States since the creation of 
the European Communities. A considerable wave of decentralization has swept across 
the Member States between the 1970s and the early 2000s.8  
These developments have paved the way to a change not only in the constitutional 
position of the regions in the EU, but also in the narrative concerning these authorities. 
The EU does no longer appear totally ‘blind’ vis-à-vis the regions.9 There is consensus 
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within the political and academic discourse that, although the EU has not become the 
‘Europe of the regions’ some, especially in the 1980s, had hoped for,10 the EU in its 
current form is an ‘Europe with the regions’.11 This phrase evokes a system of Euro-
pean governance in which the regions play an important role, enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU and in which the notion of ‘multi-level governance’ is increasingly 
accepted as an important feature of the EU.12 There are three areas in which the ‘Eu-
rope with the regions’ manifests itself: (1) in relation to the implementation of obliga-
tions arising from the EU or compliance by the regions with those obligations; (2) in 
relation to the protection of the autonomy and identities of the regions through, for 
example, the principle of subsidiarity; (3) in relation, finally, to regional participation in 
EU processes and particularly decision-making processes.  
Most of the outlined developments have taken place in the political sphere or through 
Treaty amendments. Despite the emphatic and, at least symbolically, generous toward 
the regions, ‘general clauses’ of Article 4(2) and Article 5(3) TEU, the role played by 
the Court of Justice in this field appears surprisingly small if compared to other areas 
of European integration. Is there a discrepancy between the limited impact of the Court 
in this field and developments in the political sphere, including the dominant narrative 
of an ‘Europe with the regions’? And if there is such discrepancy, why is this the case? 
Is the Court ideologically opposed to an increasing ‘regionalisation’ of the EU or are 
there structural hindrances preventing the Court from facilitating breakthroughs for the 
regions? 
As well as by answering these questions, this article innovates the landscape in a 
threefold manner:13 first, by adopting a more comprehensive approach than previous 
studies; rather than focusing on a particular stream of the CJEU’s case-law, the article 
analyses the entire case-law of the CJEU on the regions and, by so doing, offers a 
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bien, ‘Regions and European Courts: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of Member 
States’, E.L. Rev., 2010, Vol. 35, No. 5, pp. 609-35; K. Lenaerts, ‘EU Federalism in 3-D’, in: 
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more complete evaluation of the jurisprudence of the Court on regional matters. This 
approach will lead to a more accurate evaluation of the CJEU’s attitude vis-à-vis the 
regions and will take stock of the most recent developments in the case-law concern-
ing in particular the use of the proportionality test in cases concerning the fundamental 
freedoms and the regions. 
Second, the article challenges the two dominating narratives emerging from the liter-
ature. It rebuts both the suggestion that the Court is impermeable to the role of the 
regions in the EU due to the residual ‘regional blindness’ of the (CJ)EU,14 but also the 
opposite narrative, emerging from the more recent literature, whereby the Court of 
Justice’s recent case-law has advanced significantly the recognition of the role of the 
regions.15 This article will argue that the breakthroughs facilitated by the CJEU are 
limited to a ‘negative’ recognition of the regions by the Court, that is, to the mere 
acknowledgement, to a point, on the EU level of the constitutional role and responsi-
bilities of the regions emerging from the domestic sphere. A full recognition of the ‘third 
level’, though, would also require the ‘positive’ recognition of the participation rights of 
the regions in EU processes, including in particular decision-making processes – a 
perspective that is still absent, or almost so, in the case-law of the Court. 
Third, the article contributes new insights by offering an explanation of the discrepancy 
between the upwards political trajectory of the regions in the EU and the absence of 
full ‘positive’ recognition by the CJEU of the same trajectory. In this way, the article 
also contributes to the discussion of the possible way forward for the regions in the EU 
in the absence of their full recognition by the CJEU. 
The importance of these questions goes beyond the ‘Europe of the regions’. They shall 
contribute new knowledge on two fundamental and more general issues concerning 
EU law. The first concerns the ability of the Court of Justice to shape European inte-
gration. The second concerns the nature of the EU as a ‘multilevel polity’ and, more 
specifically, the question of the legal meaning of ‘Europe with the regions’, that is, of 
the overall position and role of the regions in the EU. 
The article is sub-divided into three parts. The first part analyses the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice on the implementation of EU obligations (2.). The second part 
studies the protection of regional autonomy and regional identities (3.-4.). The third 
part deals with regional participation in EU processes including decision-making pro-
cesses (5.-6.). A critical discussion of the findings will take place in the concluding 
remarks (7.). 
 
Part I – Regions vis-à-vis EU law obligations 
 
2. Implementation of and compliance with EU law obligations 
 
The Court of Justice recognises the duty of the regions to abide by EU law including 
a fortiori the duty to adopt measures to implement it. This duty derives from the Court’s 
construction of the regions as an ‘emanation of the state’, a construction that emerged 
for the first time in Costanzo, where the Court classified local and regional authorities 
as part of the state and recognised the vertical direct effect of a directive against an 
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 K. Lenaerts, ‘EU Federalism in 3-D’, pp. 14-44. See also E. Cloots, ‘The European Court of 
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Italian municipality.16 A further result of the same logical premise (the regions are em-
anations of the state) is that the regional, federal or otherwise decentralised structure 
of a Member State cannot be invoked by a Member State as a defence to justify the 
failure to implement or to comply with EU obligations.17 This is no different from the 
rules governing State responsibility under general international law, according to which 
a State cannot invoke internal constitutional hindrances for excusing non-compliance 
with its legal obligations.18 Only the Member State will therefore bear the responsibility 
toward the EU for an infringement of EU law,19 even though each national law may 
then choose to create mechanisms to hold liable the region that caused the infringe-
ment.20 
According to the Court of Justice, the duty to comply with or to implement EU obliga-
tions shall not lead, as a rule, to an alteration of the internal division of powers between 
central government and regions. In the case Digibet, for example, the Court of Justice 
stated in clear-cut terms that “the division of competences between the [German] Län-
der cannot be called into question, since it benefits from the protection conferred by 
Article 4(2) TEU”.21 In Digibet the Court also reiterated the principle, already consist-
ently sketched out in its case-law since 1971, that the imposition by the EU of powers 
or obligations upon the Member States for the purposes of the implementation of EU 
law cannot alter the allocation of responsibilities within the Member States.22 Any al-
teration of the internal division of powers can only come from an autonomous decision 
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 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano (103/88), paras 28-33. The construction has been 
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(eds), The Role of the Regions in EU Governance, pp. 297-346 at pp. 335-36.   
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34. On the protection granted by Article 4(2) TEU to the division of competences within a 
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of the Member State, for example, in the form of substitute powers of the central gov-
ernment in case of failure by a region to implement obligations arising from the EU,23 
or in order to ensure the correct implementation of EU rules.24 Only compliance with 
the free movements may require, according to the Court, vertical (between regional 
and national authorities25) or horizontal coordination (between regional authorities26) 
in order to ensure that different national and/or territorial rules do not jeopardise the 
achievement of legitimate public interest objectives (such as, tackling gaming addic-
tion among the population) which could in principle justify restrictions on the free move-
ments. 
In its recent case-law concerning conflicts between the free movements and the fed-
eral/regional structure of a Member State, the Court appears to have departed from 
its earlier patterns so well illustrated by Cloots.27 Cloots shows that in cases involving 
constitutional rights the Court of Justice regards the protection of the right as a ‘legiti-
mate interest’ which, in principle, justifies a restriction on the fundamental freedoms. 
More specifically, the Court adopts a ‘balancing’ approach and uses the proportionality 
review to strike a ‘fair balance’ between the constitutional right and the free movement, 
often concluding in favour of the constitutional right (for example, in Omega the par-
ticular construction of the principle of human dignity in German constitutional law was 
upheld against the internal market argument28). In contrast to this approach, in cases 
concerning the conflict between the federal/regional structure of a Member State and 
the free movements, the Court used to resolve the matter through ‘categorisation’, that 
is, by deciding whether a situation is or not ‘purely internal’ to one Member State. The 
‘categorisation’ approach always prioritises free movements in ‘not purely internal sit-
uations’ and regional measures in ‘purely internal situations’. An important example of 
‘categorisation’ in favour of the free movements is the Flemish Care Insurance case 
where the Court, without conducting any balancing between competing interests, held 
that a residence requirement for the entitlement to a regional benefit constituted an 
obstacle to both freedom of movement for workers and freedom of establishment. The 
Court reached this conclusion because the internal allocation of responsibilities within 
a Member State cannot be invoked to legitimise a restriction on the fundamental free-
doms and did not even examine the proportionality of the regional measure.29 
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 French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government, aka ‘Flemish Care 
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More recently, though, both in Carmen Media and in Digibet the Court seems to have 
mitigated what Cloots describes as differentiated treatments of the constitutional rights 
(in which decisions are always based on balancing) and of federal/regional structures 
(where decisions are always based on categorisation). Even in situations which are 
not ‘purely internal’ to one Member State (such as, indeed, in Carmen Media and 
Digibet), the Court introduced elements of the balancing of competing interests. In-
stead of concluding automatically in favour of the free movements due to the ‘not 
purely internal’ nature of the situation, in these cases the Court delegated to the refer-
ring domestic court the evaluation of the ‘suitability’30 or of the ‘proportionality’31 of the 
regional legislation. In Libert, however, concerning a Flemish decree which subjected 
the transfer of immovable property in certain communes to a ‘sufficient connection’ 
between the prospective buyer and those communes, the Court appears to have ex-
panded the scope of the notion of ‘not purely internal situation’ and, accordingly, to 
have limited the areas in which automatic categorisation in favour of the regions may 
take place. The Court acknowledged that, although the applicants in the main pro-
ceedings and all aspects of the main proceedings were confined within one Member 
State, it is ‘not inconceivable’ that individuals or undertakings established in other 
Member States could be interested in purchasing or leasing immovable property lo-
cated in the target communes. Therefore, the mere possibility that individuals or un-
dertakings from other Member States might be affected by the provisions of one re-
gion, suffices in order to make a situation ‘not purely internal’.32  
An interesting albeit isolated statement not further developed in the Court’s final deci-
sion, can be found in the Opinion that Advocate General Kokott delivered in a case 
concerning a failure by the Spanish Autonomous Communities to implement Directive 
2000/60/EC on water policy. Contrary to the argument advanced by Spain that a na-
tional regulation transposing the directive already ensured full compliance with EU ob-
ligations, AG Kokott pointed out that the subsidiary application of national rules is likely 
to be in breach of Spanish constitutional law, since it would not acknowledge suffi-
ciently the legislative responsibility associated with the legislative competence of the 
Autonomous Communities. This acknowledgment is rich of potential, because AG Ko-
kott implicitly recognises that the right, along with the duty, of the Autonomous Com-
munities to take care of the implementation of EU law in the areas falling within their 
legislative responsibility is an essential part of the constitutional identity of the Spanish 
State.33  
An important recognition of regional autonomy, can be seen, before the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, in the landmark case Portugal v Commission, concerning State 
aid. In this case the Court had to determine whether a tax benefit accorded by a region 
in the exercise of its constitutionally established fiscal autonomy constituted, for the 
sole reason of the limited geographical application of the measure, a ‘selective’ ad-
vantage prohibited under Article 87(1) TEC (now Article 107(1) TFEU). The Court of-
fered protection to the fiscal autonomy of the regions by concluding that a measure 
could not be regarded as selective “on the sole ground that it is applicable only in a 
limited geographical area of a Member State”.34 According to the Court, if a region is 
‘sufficiently autonomous’, it can adopt a tax rate lower than the national rate in order 
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 Digibet (C-156/13), para. 41.  
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 Eric Libert (C-197/11 and C-203/11), para. 34.  
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 Opinion of AG Kokott, Commission v Spain (Case C-151/12), paras 34-35.    
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 Portugal v Commission (C-88/03), para. 60.       
to support the undertakings present in the region’s territory without incurring automat-
ically in the State aid prohibition of Article 107(1) TFEU.35 
In summary, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on implementation of and com-
pliance with EU obligations reflects an approach by the Court that takes into account 
the role of the regions as emerging from the notion of ‘Europe with the regions’. The 
regions have the right and the duty to implement and comply with EU obligations. The 
Court of Justice does not accept any alteration of the division of powers within Member 
States with a federal or regional structure as a result of the requirement to implement 
EU law or to comply with it, unless this is absolutely necessary. In an isolated Opinion 
Advocate General Kokott appeared to go as far as suggesting that the implementation 
of EU law by the regions in areas falling within their remit might be an essential part of 
the constitutional identity of the Member State concerned. 
 
Part II – The protection of regional autonomy and regional identities 
 
3. Subsidiarity and closeness clauses and their relevance to the regions 
 
Subsidiarity is symbolically one of the most important elements of the ‘Europe with the 
regions’. As previously mentioned, since the coming into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
Article 5(3) TEU envisages that “the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either 
at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.” The ‘regional and 
local level’ shall therefore be part of the assessment by the Court of Justice as much 
as the ‘central level’. 
Claims concerning a breach of subsidiarity have never led to the annulment of an act 
by the Court of Justice. Despite this, studies of the case-law of the Court suggest that 
the Court carries out a sufficiently robust subsidiarity scrutiny.36 The fact that until now 
the Court has never annulled an act on ground of a breach of subsidiarity is primarily 
due to the limited number of cases in which subsidiarity pleas have been brought be-
fore the Court,37 as well as to the fact that in all the cases there were plausible justifi-
cations for the action by the Union.38 In theory, subsidiarity has a symbolically im-
portant ally in the principle of closeness of Articles 1(2) and 10(3) TEU, pursuant to 
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which in the EU ‘decisions shall be taken as closely as possible to the citizen’. So far, 
however, the Court of Justice has never pronounced specifically on the principle of 
closeness in relation to the powers of the regions. Occasionally this principle has been 
referred to in passing by Advocates General in cases concerning subsidiarity, however 
no reference to closeness is contained in judgments of the Court.39 
It is hard to figure out exactly how the Court of Justice could give more substance to 
the rights of the regions through subsidiarity. This is because the regions are seen by 
the Court as mere ‘parts’ of a Member State and the Court is likely to carry out an 
overall evaluation of whether an objective could be better achieved at Union or at 
Member State level, including the regional and local level, rather than embarking on a 
separate analysis of whether the same objective could be better achieved by one 
Member State at central or at regional and local level. 
None of the cases on subsidiarity landed before the Court of Justice so far has ever 
concerned directly regions or local authorities and the protection for regional and local 
authorities in Article 5(3) TEU has so far remained on paper.40 The only partial excep-
tion is the recent Germany v Commission, where the General Court dealt with a sub-
sidiarity plea whereby Germany claimed that the Commission had encroached on “the 
procedural autonomy of the Member States and the municipalities in the field of spatial 
planning.” Germany argued that “This is a field which is better managed by the Mem-
ber States and, where appropriate, regional and local actors”. The General Court, 
however, ultimately held that Germany had failed to demonstrate that the Commission 
had encroached on its field of competence resulting from the application of the princi-
ple of subsidiarity.41 Even in this case, though, the Court did not apply in fact the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity to the EU-regions dichotomy, but to the EU-Member State dichot-
omy, concluding that the Commission had not infringed the principle of subsidiarity vis-
à-vis Germany rather than vis-à-vis Bavaria.  
Nettesheim applies to subsidiarity the notion of ‘political law’. This indicates those legal 
provisions which are applicable only or mainly through ‘political coordination’, that is, 
through procedural arrangements which ensure proper consideration for subsidiarity 
in the legislative process. The role of the courts in relation to these provisions would 
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be the enforcement of the various procedures of ‘political coordination’.42 The Amster-
dam Subsidiarity Protocol of 1997 laid out procedural requirements to ensure that the 
principle of subsidiarity received due consideration by the Union legislator. The Protocol 
established that “For any proposed Community legislation, the reasons on which it is 
based shall be stated with a view to justifying its compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality; the reasons for concluding that a Community objective 
can be better achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative or, 
wherever possible, quantitative indicators.”43 This obligation contained an additional 
duty for the Commission, that had to “justify the relevance of its proposals with regard 
to the principle of subsidiarity”, as well as in relation to the Parliament and the Council, 
that had to “consider their consistency with Article 3b of the Treaty”.44 Similar obliga-
tions are put forward in the new Subsidiarity Protocol attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, 
where it stipulates that “Draft [Union] legislative acts shall be justified with regard to 
the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality” through “a detailed statement making 
it possible to appraise compliance with the principles”.45 
These procedural safeguards are legally binding and judicially enforceable. However, 
the judicial review of the ‘duty to state reasons’ has historically been light touch. In-
deed, so long as the institutions adequately take into account subsidiarity concerns 
during the legislative process, the Court does not require the act to contain an explicit 
explanation of compliance with subsidiarity. In Germany v European Parliament and 
Council, the Court stressed that, so long as the subsidiarity aspect has been consid-
ered by the law-making institutions, there does not exist a duty to make express ref-
erence to subsidiarity in the act.46 Along the same lines, in Netherlands v European 
Parliament and Council, the Court dismissed the claim that the Directive on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions did not state sufficient reasons. The Court 
found that the requirement was met, as “Compliance with the principle of subsidiarity 
is necessarily implicit in the fifth, sixth and seventh recitals of the preamble to the 
Directive, which state that, in the absence of action at Community level, the develop-
ment of the laws and practices of the different Member States impedes the proper 
functioning of the internal market”.47 In Estonia v European Parliament and Council, 
concerning the EU Accounting Directive, the Court even held that there is no duty to 
state reasons in relation to every provision of an act and that it is presumed that a 
Member State knows about the fundamental reasons of an act also as a result of its 
participation in the Council.48 In Philip Morris, more recently, the Court held that the 
Commission’s proposal for a directive and its preliminary impact assessment included 
sufficient information for the EU legislature and the national parliaments to determine 
whether the proposal complied with the principle of subsidiarity, as well as to enable 
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individuals to understand the reasons relating to that principle and the Court to exer-
cise its power of review.49 
Although the Court of Justice has never declared the invalidity of an act for a breach 
of a procedural requirement, the judicial enforceability of subsidiarity-related proce-
dural requirements is confirmed by a number of cases in which the Court of Justice 
stated that the EU judicature has responsibility for the monitoring of compliance with 
the substantive conditions set out in Article 5(3) TEU and compliance with the proce-
dural safeguards provided for by the new Subsidiarity Protocol.50 
The most important procedural innovation introduced by the Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol 
is the ‘early warning system’.51 The rationale for the early warning system is to ensure 
appropriate consideration of subsidiarity by the proponent of a legislative act and the 
Union legislature.52 
In theory, the early warning system could change the historic self-restraint of the Court 
of Justice in relation to subsidiarity. The evidence contained in the reasoned opinions 
of the national parliaments and of the Commission could be taken into account by the 
Court when addressing a subsidiarity complaint. Furthermore, the procedural require-
ments of the early warning system seem to be judicially enforceable by the Court and 
failure to comply with these could lead to the invalidation of an act. In this way, how-
ever, the Court would be enforcing certain procedural requirements rather than sub-
sidiarity per se. There is no case to date in which a lack of compliance with the early 
warning system has been brought to the attention of the Court of Justice. 
A similar tendency towards the ‘proceduralisation’ of subsidiarity can be seen, specif-
ically in relation to the regions, in the role of the CoR concerning subsidiarity. When 
performing its consultative role, the CoR shall express its views on the conformity of a 
legislative proposal with subsidiarity.53 The new Subsidiarity Protocol gives the CoR 
the right to challenge a legislative act on grounds of an infringement of subsidiarity.54 
Until now no challenge has been lodged by the CoR against an act for an infringement 
of subsidiarity. It cannot be excluded, however, that the right to challenge an act for a 
breach of subsidiarity, albeit not yet exercised, may have strengthened the opinions 
of the CoR vis-à-vis the law-making institutions and that, accordingly, the CoR may 
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now be playing a stronger role in the legislative process than prior to the Lisbon 
Treaty.55 
In summary, the new subsidiarity clause has not made, up to now, and it is unlikely to 
make in the future a great deal of difference to the regions. This is not due to an anti-
regional attitude of the Court. At the present stage of European integration, the regions 
are, and are therefore seen by the Court, as ‘parts’ of a Member State. Accordingly, 
the Court is likely to carry out an overall evaluation of whether an objective could be 
better achieved at Union or at Member State level, a level which includes the regions, 
rather than embarking on a separate analysis of whether the same objective could be 
better achieved by one Member State at central or at regional and local level. So far, 
only in one case the principle of subsidiarity has been invoked to protect the regions 
and the Court has indeed adopted the approach of looking at the overall position of 
the Member State vis-à-vis the Union intervention, rather than specifically at the posi-
tion and prerogatives of the region concerned. Since the regions continue essentially 
to be seen by the Court as ‘parts of a state’ or ‘sub-state units’, it appears unlikely that 
the new subsidiarity clause could produce a significant change in the jurisprudence of 
the Court. This is also due the lack of ‘privileged applicant’ status of the regions under 
Article 263 TFEU (see infra section 5). The same conclusion applies by analogy to the 
closeness clause of Article 10(3) TEU. 
The progressive proceduralisation of subsidiarity concerns also the role of the regions. 
The increased role of the CoR, in particular, discloses important opportunities for the 
regions in the legislative process, especially in relation to subsidiarity. Another poten-
tially important breakthrough for the regions with legislative powers is the early warning 
system, whereby legislative houses representing the regions at national level (for ex-
ample, the German Bundesrat or the Austrian Bundesrat) or regional parliaments with 
legislative powers have a role, albeit limited, to play (see Article 6(1) of the new Sub-
sidiarity Protocol). However, the enforcement of procedural safeguards would be the 
enforcement of procedural requirements rather than an enforcement of the principle 
of subsidiarity per se. Although the Court of Justice has repeatedly stressed its will-
ingness to enforce procedural aspects of subsidiarity, there has been no case to date 
in which a breach of a procedural safeguard has been brought to the attention of the 
Court, with the sole exception of the ‘duty to state reasons’. As to a possible failure by 
national parliaments to consult regional parliaments with legislative powers, that would 
not invalidate the EU legislative process as it is a process internal to one Member 
State and at this stage of European integration there is a non-permeability between 
processes within a Member State and processes at EU level. 
 
4. The protection of regional cultures – The regional languages  
  
The notion of ‘Europe with the regions’ also includes the protection of regional cultures 
and particularly, as an essential part of these cultures, of the languages in use in the 
territorial subdivisions of a Member State.56 Cloots and Sottiaux correctly observe that 
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“processes of devolution almost invariably coincided with the granting of (co-)official 
status to the language of sub-State nations, at least within those nations’ own re-
gion.”57 The case-law on regional languages concerns only three Member States in 
which the protection of certain linguistic groups is embedded in the constitutional law: 
Belgium, where there are three linguistic communities (French, Dutch and German); 
Italy, where the constitutional law protects the rights of linguistic minorities in South 
Tyrol and in other regions; and Spain, where the Constitution protects the linguistic 
diversity of the country including in particular the languages spoken in Catalonia and 
in the Basque Country.58 
The first thing that emerges consistently from the case-law since Groener59 is that the 
Member States can adopt policies to protect their languages including languages spo-
ken by minority groups, or in regions where a language different from the official lan-
guage of the Member State is spoken widely or by the majority of the population. These 
policies, however, must not be in breach of the four fundamental freedoms. More spe-
cifically, they must not constitute a discrimination against nationals or companies from 
other Member States, nor be disproportionate to the aim they pursue. 
The same rules apply not only if the language requirements are set by public authori-
ties in a Member State but also if these are set by private persons.60 In Angonese, for 
example, the Court held that the language requirement set by a private bank, Cassa 
di Risparmio di Bolzano, that its employees must be able to demonstrate that they are 
bilingual Italian and German speakers (German being the language spoken by the 
majority of the population in that particular province of Italy), is not per se in breach of 
free movement of workers. However, the Court found that it is ‘disproportionate’ to 
require job applicants to provide evidence of their linguistic knowledge exclusively by 
means of one particular diploma issued only in one particular province of a Member 
State, because that would make it excessively difficult, if not impossible, for anyone 
who is not from that province, to apply for the position.61 
In Las, in relation to legislation in force in the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium, re-
quiring the employers based in that territory to draft employment contracts in Dutch, 
the Court held that the national identity of the Member States “includes protection of 
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the official language or languages of those States”.62 In the Opinion on this case, Ad-
vocate General Jääskinen argued that the notion of ‘official language’ embraces “the 
official language or various official languages of the State and, where appropriate, the 
territorial subdivisions in which the various official languages are in use. The concept 
of ‘national identity’ therefore concerns the choices made as to the languages used at 
national or regional level”.63 The promotion of official languages ‘at national or regional 
level’ can justify restrictions of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, 
subject to compliance with the proportionality principle. More specifically, national or 
regional measures capable of hindering the exercise of fundamental freedoms guar-
anteed by the Treaty, or of making it less attractive, may be allowed only if they pursue 
a legitimate objective in the public interest, are appropriate to ensuring the attainment 
of that objective, and do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pur-
sued.64 The Court in Las concluded that the Flemish decree on the compulsory use of 
Dutch in employment contracts goes beyond what is strictly necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the law (protection and promotion of Dutch, protection of the employee, 
facilitation of the work of the employment inspectorate) and therefore imposes a dis-
proportionate restriction on the free movement of workers within the EU.65 Accordingly, 
“Article 45 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a federated entity of 
a Member State [...], which requires all employers whose established place of busi-
ness is located in that entity’s territory to draft cross-border employment contracts ex-
clusively in the official language of that federated entity, failing which the contracts are 
to be declared null and void by the national courts of their own motion.”66 
Another relevant stream of case-law concerns the interaction between regional rules 
on the use of a particular language for the information appearing on products and free 
movement of goods. In Colim and Piageme I the Court circumscribed the compatibility 
of national or regional rules imposing the use of a particular language for the labelling 
of foodstuffs (Piageme I) or the information appearing on imported products (Colim). 
In Piageme I the Court held that the obligation exclusively to use the language of the 
linguistic region (Dutch, spoken in the Flemish-speaking region of Belgium) constitutes 
a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction (MEQR) on imports, 
prohibited under the rules that govern the free movement of goods.67 More specifically, 
although the Court did not mention proportionality expressly here, such measures ap-
pear ‘disproportionate’ for not allowing for the use of another language “easily under-
stood by purchasers”, or for failing to ensure that the purchaser is informed by other, 
arguably less restrictive, measures,68 such as designs, symbols or pictograms.69 
A third group of cases concerns the cultural policies of the Member States or of their 
regions requiring, inter alia, the broadcasting of programmes in particular languages 
or the production of films in the official, including the regional, languages of a particular 
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Member State. In UPC the Court held that the ‘must-carry’ obligation for cable opera-
tors active in Brussels-Capital to broadcast a number of programmes in Dutch, as part 
of the cultural policy of Belgium to safeguard the ‘freedom of expression’ of the various 
linguistic components that exist in that region, is in principle compatible with the free-
dom to provide services, provided that the policy is ‘not disproportionate’ in relation to 
that objective.70 In this particular case, by ‘not disproportionate’ the Court meant that 
“the manner in which [the policy] is applied must be subject to a transparent procedure 
based on objective non-discriminatory criteria known in advance.”71 In UTECA, con-
cerning the obligation for Spanish television operators to earmark a small percentage 
of their operating revenue to fund films in one of the official languages of the Member 
State does not constitute a breach of the principle of non-discrimination of Article 12 
EC, nor a State aid in favour of the cinematographic industry of that Member State.72 
A further stream of case-law concerns the right of people belonging to a linguistic mi-
nority recognised by a Member State to require that criminal proceedings against them 
take place, in a particular region or province of that Member State, in a language other 
than the principal language of the Member State concerned. In Mutsch (criminal pro-
ceedings against a Luxembourg national and German native speaker working in Bel-
gium) and Bickel and Franz (an Austrian lorry driver and a German tourist in Italy re-
spectively) the Court held that it would be a discrimination against a worker (Mutsch), 
or against a service provider (Bickel), or a service recipient (Franz) from another Mem-
ber State if the right to require that the criminal trial takes place in the language spoken 
by a recognised linguistic minority was limited to the nationals of the host State (Ger-
man-speaking Belgian citizens residing in a German-speaking municipality of Belgium 
and Italian nationals residing in the Province of Bolzano whose first language is Ger-
man).73 
An important case, finally, is Kamberaj in which the Court held that the measure of the 
Italian Province of Bolzano which prioritised the members of the three regional linguis-
tic groups (Italian, German, Ladin) in the allocation of housing benefits, discriminated 
against third-country nationals enjoying the status of long-term resident conferred pur-
suant to the provisions of Directive 2003/109.74 From this judgment it emerges a fortiori 
that national or regional measures are not allowed to protect linguistic groups by grant-
ing to their members social benefits (such as social housing), if the criteria adopted to 
allocate these benefits infringe the rights deriving from EU law of people not belonging 
to one of the protected groups. 
To sum up, the Court of Justice acknowledges that the cultural policies and measures 
of the Member States at national or at regional level, aiming in particular to protect the 
rights of linguistic groups or to promote or protect a language spoken by a minority in 
a particular region, are ‘legitimate aims’ which, in principle, could justify limitations of 
the free movements. ‘Legitimate aims’ identified by the Court range from the objective 
sociological reality of the linguistic diversity within one region75 to the promotion of the 
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local language,76 the protection of the rights of defence of the members of the linguistic 
group in criminal proceedings,77 the protection of consumers in a particular region,78 
the safeguarding of the freedom of expression of the different components which exist 
in one region,79 defending and promoting the official languages of the Member State.80 
The protection of regional languages is particularly strong where these are among the 
‘official languages’ of a Member State, in which case they fall within the scope of the 
protection of Article 4(2) TEU as part of the ‘national identity of the Member States, 
inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures’. Any measures pro-
tecting the regional languages, however, must not be ‘disproportionate’, that is, incom-
patible with internal market requirements. The proportionality review linked to internal 
market freedoms, though, does not automatically nor necessarily lead to judicial deci-
sions against the protection of regional languages. The Court of Justice’s approach to 
cases involving the protection of languages appears quite balanced. In the analysed 
cases, the Court found against the protection of languages only in situations in which 
there was a clear incompatibility with the fundamental freedoms (for example, the ob-
ligation to draft transnational employment contracts exclusively in Dutch or to label 
imported products exclusively in Dutch, like in Las and Piageme I respectively).81 This 
is a reflection of, if not a subscription by the Court, to the ‘Europe with the regions’, as 
opposed to an ‘Europe of the regions’. ‘Regional languages’ enjoy an enhanced pro-
tection from the EU as ‘part’ of the national identity of the Member States and as a 
result of their official recognition by the Member States, rather than separately from 
and independently of the Member States. This observation appears corroborated in-
directly, through an argumentum a contrario, by the Court’s decision in Vardyn and 
Wardyn, where, as the Lithuanian Constitution designates Lithuanian as the only offi-
cial State language, the Court ended up upholding the position that members of the 
Polish-speaking minority living in Lithuania have no claim under EU law to have their 
names spelt in Polish characters in Lithuanian official documents.82 In Vardyn and 
Wardyn emerges that the protection of minority languages, far from going against na-
tional constitutional laws and policies, shall be consistent with those. The protection of 
‘regional languages’ is therefore a manifestation of an ‘Europe with the regions’, in 
which the recognition of the regions is respectful of the prerogatives of the Member 
States, rather than of an ‘Europe of the regions’ in which the regions receive recogni-
tion to detriment of the traditional standing and role of the Member States.  
 
Part III – Regional participation in EU processes 
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5. Locus standi of the regions  
 
The notion of ‘Europe with the regions’ requires the involvement of the regions in Union 
processes including the actions of direct annulment of Union acts before Union courts. 
The regions may have an interest in challenging the validity of Union acts, when these 
negatively affect their fundamental interests (for example, when they are perceived by 
the region as detrimental to the local economy). The consolidated jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice on Article 263 TFEU, however, does not grant the status of ‘privileged 
applicants’ to the regions. In terms of their locus standi (or standing), territorial author-
ities fall in the same category of applicants (‘non-privileged’) as the individuals.83 Union 
courts have also dismissed the argument that respect for national identity pursuant to 
Article 4(2) TEU should award the regions ‘privileged applicant’ status.84 Accordingly, 
they may challenge without particular restrictions acts addressed to them, as well as 
‘regulatory acts which do not entail implementing measures’ without having to prove 
‘individual concern’.85 Exactly like individuals, though, they can challenge acts which 
are not addressed to them (for example, a decision addressed to their Member State), 
only if they are able to demonstrate that these acts are of ‘direct’ and ‘individual con-
cern’ to them. Showing ‘direct’ and ‘individual concern’ is not easy in practice.86 
As to ‘direct concern’, for instance, the fact that a region has got responsibility for the 
execution of a project funded by the EU, does not automatically meet the ‘direct con-
cern’ threshold required to challenge an act withdrawing entirely or in part the funding 
previously awarded. In Sicily v Commission, for example, in relation to a decision to 
withdraw the funds for a European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) funded pro-
ject, the Court of Justice held that the Sicily Region was not ‘directly concerned’. The 
Court stated that “the position of ‘authority responsible for the application’ [...] does not 
have the effect of putting the appellant [Region] in a direct relationship with the Com-
munity assistance, which [...] was applied for by the Italian Government and granted 
to the Italian Republic”.87 Likewise, the fact that the project has to be executed in one 
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region’s territory, does not per se make the challenge admissible. The Court of First 
Instance (CFI), for example, declared inadmissible due to lack of ‘direct concern’ an 
application filed by the Greek local authority Koinotita of Grammatiko against a Com-
mission’s decision to fund the creation of a landfill site in that location.88 
Showing ‘individual concern’ is not easier either. The fact, for instance, that an EU act 
deals with an issue falling within the responsibility of one region, is not sufficient in 
order to entitle that authority to challenge the measure. In Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Com-
mission, for example, concerning a regulation which delimited temporally the right to 
use the label ‘Tocai friulano’, a wine variety typical of Friuli, the Court of First Instance 
held that “the division of legislative and regulatory powers within a Member State is 
solely a matter for the constitutional law of that State and has no effect from the point 
of view of assessing the possible effects of a Community legal measure on the inter-
ests of a territorial body.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Region Friuli-Ve-
nezia Giulia was not ‘individually concerned’ by the contested legal provision.89 
The fact, alone, that an act negatively affects a local interest is not sufficient to ground 
‘individual concern’. In Cantabria v Council, the CFI held that “any general interest the 
applicant [Autonomous Community] may have, as a third person, in obtaining a result 
which will favour the economic prosperity of a given business and, as a result, the level 
of employment in the geographical region where it carries on its activities, is insuffi-
cient, on its own, to enable the applicant to be regarded as ‘concerned’ […], nor, a 
fortiori, as being individually concerned”.90 
Not even the status as an ‘outermost region’ under Article 349 TFEU (former 299 EC) 
does automatically, on its own, lead to ‘individual concern’. In Azores v Council, for 
example, the President of the CFI held that the fact that an applicant region enjoys a 
special status under the Treaties does not suffice in order to show ‘individual concern’, 
“[o]therwise the outermost regions mentioned in Article 299(2) EC would acquire rights 
to bring legal proceedings akin to the rights of Member States. Such a result would be 
contrary to Article 230 EC [now Art. 263 TFEU] which does not entitle, by analogy, 
regional entities to bring actions under the same conditions as Member States”.91 
The approach of Union courts to cases concerning State aid is more open. Courts 
grant regions locus standi in relation to Union acts which prevent them from granting 
aid to companies, or which require them to withdraw and recover the aid already 
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granted.92 In Flemish Region v Commission, for example, the CFI acknowledged that 
“The contested decision [concerning aid granted by the Region to a Belgian airline] 
has a direct and individual effect on the legal position of the Flemish Region [since] 
[such decision] directly prevents [the Region] from exercising its own powers, which 
here consist of granting the aid in question, as it sees fit”.93 In Land Saxony v Com-
mission, as well as in Friuli-Venezia Giulia v Commission, the CFI recognized the locus 
standi of the applicant, given that the contested measure required the region to recover 
from the beneficiaries an aid previously granted.94 In 2000 the Sicily Region chal-
lenged a Commission’s decision which envisaged that the State aid allocated by a 
regional law in favour of undertakings operating in the agriculture or fisheries sector 
was incompatible with EU law and that the aid in question had to be accordingly with-
drawn. The Commission did not seek to argue that the measure was not of ‘direct and 
individual concern’ to the applicant, and the CFI held the action admissible, after veri-
fying that it had been brought within the correct timeframe.95 In numerous cases since, 
Union courts showed the tendency to accept that, as a rule, in cases concerning State 
aid, the regions shall be granted standing,96 although the applicant still needs to have 
a relevant legal interest in the annulment of an act.97 
Despite the difficulties faced by the regions when they attempt to challenge directly 
the validity of Union acts which are not addressed to them, Union courts maintain that 
there is no gap in the legal protection afforded to them by EU law. The CFI held that 
regions are able “either indirectly to plead the unlawfulness of such acts before the 
Community judicature under Art. 241 EC [now Art. 277 TFEU] or to do so before the 
national courts and ask them [...] to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling [under Art. 234 TEC, now Art. 267 TFEU] as to lawfulness”.98 In 
reality, though, Articles 277 and 267 TFEU do not seem to overcome the limited locus 
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standi of the regions. According to Article 277 TFEU, it is possible to invoke the ‘inap-
plicability’ of an ‘act of general application’ in the context of other proceedings before 
the Court. More specifically, where an applicant challenges the validity of an act im-
plementing an ‘act of general application’ which forms the legal basis of the impugned 
act, the applicant may ask the Court to declare ‘inapplicable’ the ‘act of general appli-
cation’.99 However, lacking an act implementing an ‘act of general application’, there 
would be no opportunity for an applicant region to obtain the declaration of inapplica-
bility of the ‘act of general application’.100 
Preliminary rulings (Article 267 TFEU) do not adequately fill the gap in legal protection 
either. First, the protection would depend upon the existence of a legal remedy under 
domestic law. Second, since it is the domestic courts, not the parties directly, who refer 
a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, such ‘filtering’ by the courts could prevent 
a plea for invalidity of an EU measure from landing before the Court of Justice. There-
fore, the current position leaves a gap in the judicial protection of the legal situations 
of the regions in the EU.101 At least in theory, more effective ways to fill this gap have 
been created in federal and quasi-federal Member States by enabling the sub-national 
authorities, individually (like in Belgium102) or collectively (like in Italy and Germany103), 
to require their national government to file an action for direct annulment before Union 
courts pursuant to Article 263 TFEU.104 
To conclude, with the exception of State aid cases, Union courts adopt a rather strict 
scrutiny of the locus standi of the regions. The preceding analysis shows that this is 
due to the construction that sees the regions as ‘parts’ of the Member States rather 
than as actors directly and immediately relevant to the EU. It is therefore up to the 
Member States, as a rule, to represent the interests of the regions in proceedings 
before Union courts and more in general in processes of the EU. The CFI even stated 
that “In the [EU] legal order, it is for the authorities of the State to represent any inter-
ests based on the defence of national legislation, regardless of the constitutional form 
or the territorial organisation of that State”.105 However, given that the central govern-
ment may have no obvious incentive to bring an action, to rely on the mere good will 
of the central government could be problematic.106 
 
6. Regional participation in EU decision-making processes 
 
The ‘Europe with the regions’ requires, finally, also the prompting and exploitation of 
participation channels whereby the regions make their voice heard in Brussels and 
contribute knowledge and information, as well as evaluations and views to the EU 
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legislative process. The privileged body identified to this purpose is the CoR, which is 
a consultative body. Pursuant to Article 263(3) TFEU the CoR has the status of ‘semi-
privileged applicant’ that can challenge an act in order to protect its prerogatives. Up 
to now the CoR has never filed a case to this purpose. With all probability this demon-
strates that the political institutions have observed consistently the procedural require-
ment of consulting the CoR. In this section, though, I will not focus on the role and 
prerogatives of the CoR nor on the effectiveness of the various participation channels 
available to the regions. I will rather look at the approach of the Court of Justice to 
these channels. 
The Commission has a duty to consult widely before proposing a legislative proposal 
(Article 2 Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol).107 This is, potentially, an important channel for 
dialogue and political cooperation which may assist the Commission and the law-mak-
ing institutions in determining the possible impact of a regulation. It is unlikely that the 
Court of Justice would uphold a claim based on Article 2 of the Protocol, that a certain 
act is null and void for lack of or inadequate consultation. To date, no such claim has 
been brought to the attention of the Court. However, the Court has already expressly 
recognised that consultation contributes legitimacy to Union law-making. In UEAPME 
the Court of First Instance held that whenever the European Parliament does not par-
ticipate in the enactment of a legislative measure, the principle of democracy requires 
an alternative form of participation of the people. If such participation, like in UEAPME, 
takes the form of social dialogue, the Commission and the Council have an obligation 
to verify that the social partners involved are ‘truly representative’. Only in this way the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU law-making process is ensured.108  
The early warning system, due to the eight-week deadline and the high quorum for a 
yellow or an orange card, can be a difficult channel for the regions. As a result, some 
legislative chambers representing the regions (such as, the German Bundesrat109) of-
ten voice their opinion (in relation to subsidiarity or anything else) through the ‘political 
dialogue’ launched by the Commission in 2006.110 Since it is a soft law arrangement, 
the political dialogue is not judicially enforceable, nor is there a yellow or orange card 
mechanism attached to it. However, due to its flexibility, national parliaments, including 
the legislative chambers which represent the regions, resort to this instrument more 
frequently than to the early warning system (in 2016 national parliaments issued 620 
opinions, but only 65 of those were reasoned opinions111). 
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Apart from direct lobbying of the institutions in Brussels through their liaison offices or 
their various European associations (such as, EUROCITIES or the Conference of the 
Regions with Legislative Power, REGLEG), which is by definition not regulated by law, 
the participation of the regions in EU decision-making processes takes place primarily 
at domestic level through various consultation procedures regulated by domestic law. 
A failure to comply with these procedures could not lead, obviously, to the declaration 
of invalidity of an act of the Union by the Court of Justice, although it could undermine 
its legitimacy from the point of view of the regions of one particular Member State. 
Similarly, the opening up of the Council to the regions pursuant to Article 16(2) TEU 
does not imply that the failure by a Member State to allow its representation in the 
Council by a regional minister would lead to the invalidity of the act passed by the 
Council.112 
The only case in which there is a reference, albeit limited, to regional participation in 
EU decision-making processes is Région Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Communauté d’ag-
glomération du Douaisis (France) v Commission. The GC observed that, even when 
an allegedly unlawful state aid is granted by a region, the infraction procedure of Article 
108(2) TFEU shall be opened only against the Member State. Respect, inter alia, for 
the ‘constitutional identity of the Member States’ does not confer on infra-state bodies 
(such as, the regions providing the aid, the undertakings receiving it and their compet-
itors) the same rights of defence. These bodies are mere ‘interested parties’, although 
they “have the right to be involved in the procedure to the extent appropriate in the 
light of the circumstances of the case”.113 The Member States, however, could auton-
omously decide to involve the sub-state authorities in the exercise of the rights of de-
fence of the Member State in procedures concerning State aid or any other infringe-
ment procedure.114 
To sum up, the totality of regional participation takes place outside the scope of the 
law (lobbying), through soft law and political arrangements (political dialogue), through 
channels created by the Treaties (Article 16(2) TEU), or through channels created by 
domestic law. The contribution of the Court of Justice to the development of this area 
of law has been virtually non-existent, although this is not due to a hostility of the Court 
vis-à-vis regional participation, but to the legal and practical impossibility to enforce 
judicially political and soft law mechanisms, mechanisms created and regulated by 
domestic law and participation channels opened up by EU primary law which ultimately 
rely upon internal processes outside the scope of EU law. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The previous analysis confirms that there is, definitely, a discrepancy between ‘Europe 
with the regions’ and jurisprudence of the CJEU. This discrepancy, though, does not 
emerge everywhere, nor does it emerge with the same intensity in all sectors. Indeed, 
in a number of areas the CJEU has acknowledged the role and responsibilities of the 
regions deriving from the national constitutions. Examples include the right/duty to im-
plement obligations arising from the EU, the protection of regional languages provided 
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that these are ‘official languages’ of the Member State concerned, as well as the ‘suf-
ficient autonomy’ test developed by the CJEU in Portugal v Commission in cases con-
cerning State aid. These areas of ‘negative’ recognition of the regions, though, that is, 
of recognition limited to taking account of and trying to respect the constitutional status 
of the regions which emerges from the respective national constitution, is not comple-
mented by a ‘positive’ recognition by the CJEU of the participation rights of the regions 
in EU processes, in particular decision-making processes. The only partial exception 
is the flexible approach of the Court to the locus standi in cases regarding State aid. 
Why is it so? 
Despite the traditional, almost natural, centralising ethos of constitutional courts within 
federations, the CJEU does not appear ideologically opposed to an increasing ‘region-
alisation’ of the EU. The CJEU demonstrates to be willing, as well as able, to facilitate 
important breakthroughs for the recognition of the role of the regions in the EU. There 
are fundamental structural hindrances which prevent the Court from promoting further 
advancements, both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, of the status of the regions in the Euro-
pean edifice. As to ‘positive’ recognition, the current structure of the EU, and in partic-
ular the practical impossibility of enforcing domestic constitutional rules at EU level, 
de facto prevents certain cases from landing before the CJEU, such as, for example, 
cases concerning regional participation in the Council pursuant to Article 16(2) TEU or 
regional participation in determining the negotiating position of the Member State. The 
general clauses of Article 4(2) TEU and Article 5(3) TEU are not suitable to produce a 
real breakthrough for the regions, either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. This is due to the fact 
that these clauses protect primarily the ‘national identity’ (Article 4(2) TEU) or, despite 
the new wording of the subsidiarity clause, the autonomy of the Member States (Article 
5(3) TEU). Only as a ‘side-effect’ these clauses also protect regional self-government 
and regional autonomy. As to subsidiarity specifically, the CJEU is likely to struggle to 
determine the level of government which is better placed to act in relation to a certain 
issue within one Member State. The lack of locus standi of the regions is another ob-
stacle to the landing before the CJEU of subsidiarity claims coming directly from the 
regions to protect their own prerogatives vis-à-vis the EU. 
The ‘positive’ participation of the regions in EU decision-making processes has histor-
ically always followed from Treaty amendments or developments in the political sphere 
(for example, structured or political dialogue), rather than from the activity of the CJEU. 
Especially in relation to ‘positive’ recognition of the status of the regions in the EU, the 
role of the CJEU has been limited, compared, for example, to the role of the CJEU in 
promoting integration through supremacy, direct effect, indirect effect. This is not sur-
prising though, not only because all these doctrines are conducive to more integration 
and the ‘regionalisation’ of the EU might be conducive to more fragmentation and more 
obstacles to free movements. The limited role of the CJEU in this particular field is due 
to the fact that the EU has always been, is and will continue to be in the foreseeable 
future a union of states, not an ‘Europe of the regions’. The jurisprudence of the CJEU 
on locus standi, for example, is entirely dominated by the impossibility to put the re-
gions on the same footing as the Member States. It is for the Member States to organ-
ise the regional participation in the Council pursuant to Article 16(2) TEU and for the 
national parliaments to organise the consultation of regional parliaments with legisla-
tive powers pursuant to the new Subsidiarity Protocol. The CJEU does not and cannot 
have a say on these matters and its role is therefore limited due primarily to the nature 
of the EU.  
The ‘Europe with the regions’ has developed so far and is likely to continue to develop 
via political advancements reflected in policy-making practices (such as, new ad hoc 
consultation channels), soft law arrangements and, especially, Treaty amendments 
reforming the decision-making processes (for example, a reform strengthening the role 
of the CoR). It is unlikely that further ‘positive’ opening up of the EU to the regions will 
arise, in the absence of a reform of the Treaties, directly from the judicial activism of 
the CJEU.   
So, where is the CJEU vis-à-vis the ‘Europe with the regions’? Is it totally ‘blind’ to the 
regions or has been the facilitator of important breakthroughs? The correct answer is 
probably somewhere in the middle, it has facilitated important breakthroughs for the 
regions but, at the same time, its role has been limited in other areas. So, the CJEU 
is truly in the middle, as it is the current state of the EU as an ‘Europe with the regions’, 
that is, an EU that has moved beyond the complete ‘regional blindness’ of the past but 
has not yet become, nor will it realistically in the foreseeable future, if ever, an ‘Europe 
of the regions’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
